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Abstract
In this paper we investigate the presence of asymmetric information
in the parallel trading of ten-year government fixed rate bonds (BTP)
on two secondary electronic platforms: the business-to-business (B2B)
MTS platform and the business-to-customer (B2C) BondVision one.
The two platforms are typified by a different degree of transparency.
We investigate whether the probability to encounter an informed trader
on the less transparent market is higher than the corresponding prob-
ability on the more transparent one.
Our results show that on BondVision, that is the less transparent plat-
form, the probability of encountering an informed trader is higher.
Finally we perform a series of tests to check the robustness of our
estimates. Two tests do not meet the hypothesis of independence.
Nevertheless, these findings do not controvert the hypothesis of our
model, but call for further analysis.
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1 Introduction
Nowadays the scenario for the investors has notably changed with respect to
a non so far past. The quick progresses in Information and Communication
Technology have outstandingly changed the organization of securities trad-
ing in Europe and worldwide. Trading no longer takes place in a physical
location, while trading floors and telephone networks are more and more
moving over for transactions conducted via electronic trading platforms.
Today investors have the possibility to select among a great variety of
choices what is the best suitable for their own requirements and execute their
trades. Financial securities are not only traded on regulated markets but also
on new electronic trade platforms, which are characterised by different levels
of intermediation. There has been a notable raise in the development of
these new electronic markets, where are traded securities that were already
traded in non-electronic existing markets.
All these changes have driven a great increase in theoretical works con-
cerning the analysis of market microstructure, furthermore the recent avail-
ability, at relative low costs, of high frequency datasets have contributed to
a notable increase also in empirical works.
The coexistence of multiple markets for the same asset is a pervasive
phenomenon; financial securities may trade simultaneously on a number of
markets, so the main issue of a trader is to decide how to allocate his or-
ders across the different trading venues. As a consequence, all these trad-
ing venues compete for order flow, so it is really important to understand
how inter-market competition affects market quality. This scenario raises
questions about the coexistence of markets that differ along a variety of
dimensions.
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There exists an extensive market microstructure literature on single mar-
kets, which analyses their characteristics, how they work and so on, however
there is a scarce literature on intermarket competition, where traders can
trade a same asset simultaneously on several markets and on the interac-
tions among different market segments. Government bond market has been
traditionally divided in an inter-dealer and a dealer-to-customer segment,
however, economic researches, which had analysed these two dimensions,
had focused their attention only on the more liquid inter-dealer segment
ignoring the dealer-to-customer segment.
There is a narrow theoretical and empirical literature which had nib-
bled at the impact that the existence of electronic trading platform have on
traditional markets and the chances of survival of both. One of the most
promising approach which is catching on the literature about market mi-
crostructure and more precisely, concerning how parallel trading of a security
on several markets can influence prices, is the sequential trade model. This
model combines both econometric analysis and economic theory, which was
initially used simply to analyse information aspects of the price discovery
process on financial markets.
In a sequential trade model there are three economic agents who are in
a dynamic interaction: a market maker who supplies liquidity to the market
by continuously posting prices at which the security may be bought and
sold, and two types of traders, who differ with respect to their information
set on future price movements. In this framework the market maker sets
prices without knowing whether any trader has superior information about
the fundamental value of the security. The main aim of these models is to
analyse the effects of asymmetric information among market participants on
the outcomes of the trading process.
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In this work we construct a sequential trade model to consider parallel
trading on two platforms of the secondary bond markets, MTS (Mercato
Telematico dei Titoli di Stato) and BondVsion, which are typified by a dif-
ferent degree of transparency. The Italian government bond market is one
of the largest in the world. We investigate whether the probability to en-
counter an informed trader on the less transparent market is higher than the
corresponding probability on the more transparent one.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews sequential trade
models under asymmetric information for equity and bond markets. Section
3 analyses the institutional environment. Section 4 describes the asymmetric
information model used to analyse the parallel trading on the two platforms.
Section 5 illustrates the database. Section 6 contains the empirical analysis.
Section 7 concludes.
2 Models under asymmetric information
There are two different approaches to model sequential securities market
behaviour in the presence of asymmetric information. One approach is Wal-
rasian batch models and another is sequential trade models.
In the Walrasian approach, market makers observe the net order from
traders and set a single price, at which all orders are being executed. The
trading process is a sequence of auctions based on requests to buy or sell
a specified number of securities at the market price. These models do not
allow to characterize the bid-ask spread, but focus on the effects of order
placement by informed and uniformed traders on prices. The pivotal work
in this approach is that of Kyle (1985).
The three classical papers that mathematically formalised sequential
trade models are those by Copeland and Galai (1983), Glosten and Milgrom
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(1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).
Copeland and Galai (1983) construct a one period model, where market
makers pricing, given that some fraction of traders have superior information
on the assets true value. The market maker is risk neutral and sets quotes
to maximize his expected profit. Uninformed traders know how the general
pricing process works, but they do not know the true value of the asset. The
market maker cannot identify informed traders, however he knows the prob-
ability that any trade comes from an informed or from an uninformed trader.
Therefore, the quotes set by the market maker emerge from a profit maxi-
mization problem, because he calculates the expected profit from any trade,
taking into account the probabilities of losing to the informed and gaining
to uninformed. The weakness of this model is that all private information
is made public after a trade is conducted. Even when repeated rounds of
trading are allowed, the expected loss of the market maker will remain the
same, so he has no incentive to change his quotes. This means, that in this
framework, the trading process is not informative at all. However, if private
information is revealed after each round, sequences of buys and sells may
reveal the underlying information process and affect the behaviour of prices.
The learning process from the order flow has been analysed in a dynamic
framework by Glosten and Milgrom (1985) and Easley and O’Hara (1987).
Informed traders will reveal their information by selling the asset, if they
know bad news and buying it if they observe good news.Therefore, the fact
that someone wants to sell may be interpreted as a signal to the market
maker that bad news have been received by this trader, but it may also
mean, that the trader is uninformed and simply need liquidity.
Easley and O’Hara (1987) introduced the notion of information uncer-
tainty. Glosten and Milgrom (1985) assumed that, even if the market maker
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does not observe the information event, he knows that there are traders who
always know either good or bad news. In this work, instead, it is introduced
a third possibility, i.e. the absence of any private information. In this case
the market maker will receive orders only from uninformed traders.
Another difference with the two previous works, is that the assumption
that a fixed number of securities is traded is relaxed. Now the market maker
can learn both from the direction and the size of trades. In Easley and
O’Hara (1987) may be traded two different trade sizes, large and small quan-
tities. It is assumed that uninformed traders will transact both quantities,
otherwise trade size will identify the type of trader unambiguously.
Both types of models have their deficiencies and their merits. However,
the sequential trade model is more corresponding to the actual features of
the government bond markets and, in particular, to the data available for
the empirical analysis. All these aspects make us prefer a sequential trade
approach to a batch approach. It represents not only a theoretical model of
the effects of information asymmetries on price setting behaviour, but it also
provides a coherent framework that can be used to estimate structural pa-
rameters of the model form observable quantities that are typically contained
in high frequency transactions data sets from financial markets.
2.1 Sequential trade models under asymmetric information
In this section we will briefly review some of the sequential trade models
that have been used to analyse securities behaviour under asymmetric infor-
mation. We will use the model used in Easley et al. (1996b) as the basic
sequential trade model, since it may be considered a simplified version of
its predecessors Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Easley and O’Hara (1992).
Other models may be viewed as a generalization of this, so it will serve as a
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basic framework for more complex models.
Easley et al. (1996b) setup a mixed discrete and continuous time se-
quential trade model of the trading process. In this framework traders arise
because of the interactions of three types of economic agents: informed and
uninformed traders and a risk-neutral, competitive market-maker. The ar-
rival rates of informed and uninformed traders are governed by independent
Poisson process and the likelihood of the occurrence of three different types
of information events (no news, good news and bad news) which are chosen
by nature every day, before the first trade take place. In this model, the
difference between bid and ask quotes arises only because of asymmetric in-
formation of market participants about the occurrence of information events.
Other components of the spread, such as those caused by maintaining large
inventory imbalance, or by the exercise of market power by a monopolist
market maker are left aside.
Other models, add to the basic sequential trade model in Easley et al.
(1996b) trade size and time effects. Theoretical foundations for the inclusion
of these aspects have been developed in Easley and O’Hara (1987) and Easley
and O’Hara (1992). In these works the trading day is divided into discrete
time intervals, where each interval is long enough to accommodate just one
trade. This assumption allows to define a third event, no-trade event, in
addition to buys and sells.
In Easley et al. (1996b) no-trade intervals may arise in the course of the
trading day but they are treated implicitly as zero observations of the buy
and sell sequences. Throughout the introduction of the no-trade events, the
duration between trades will have an effect on the market maker pricing
behaviour, because long durations between trades indicate the absence of
any type of information. This provide an incentive to the market maker to
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lower the spread, when the intensity of trading is low. In this catheogory
lies the works of Easley et al. (1997a), Easley et al. (1997b).
Easley et al. (1997a) additionally distinguish between two different trade
sizes, small and large trades. Easley et al. (1997b) introduce also the possi-
bility that uninformed traders condition their trades on the observed order
flow, thus inducing serial correlation in the observed trading process. They
argue that uninformed traders will consider the trading history when placing
their orders.
Finally, a further extension of the basic sequential trade model is to take
in consideration parallel trading of a same asset in two different market de-
signs. In this framework lies the works of Easley et al. (1996a), Easley et al.
(1998) and Grammig et al. (2001). The first work analyses the possibility
that the practice of cream-skimming arises in trading in two regional mar-
kets1.
Easley et al. (1998) derive a model for parallel trading in stock and option
markets. They investigate whether derivatives markets are used only for
risk hedging purposes, or whether they also constitute a venue for informed
traders.
Grammig et al. (2001) construct a sequential trade model, that allows
for parallel trading on a floor trading system requiring physical presence
of all traders and a screen trading system, that enables traders to remain
anonymous.
Following Kokot (2004), a summary of frameworks and principal results
of all the above models is reported in Table 1.
1Cream-skimming is the practice on the base of which, restricting the types of orders
they will accept, some trading venues may try to attract only profitable liquidity traders,
leaving larger, potentially more information based orders to other venues.
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2.2 Models which analyse the bond market
In spite of the importance of this market, there are not many models who
analyse the bond market. Dunne et al. (2007) consider the interaction be-
tween the inter-dealer (B2B) and the dealer-to-customer (B2C) segments of
the European bond market. They develop a model to understand the quote
dynamics in both segments and their interrelationship. They theorize that
dealers are willing to hold short or long inventory positions within defined
limits. Dealers are rewarded for this by arbitrage opportunities between
the B2C and the B2B spreads. Dunne et al. (2007) find that a large share
of the retail quotes and an even larger share of retail transactions occur
within the B2B spread. Their model explain the relatively high inter-dealer
spreads with the higher adverse selection risk carried by quote submission
in the inter-dealer market. However, this model has some weakness. Firstly,
the theoretical framework implies a rich set of predictions about the quote
dynamics, but testing these predictions requires dealer specific inventory in-
formation, which is not available. Secondly, this model lies on the inventory
cost, but one of the characteristics of the bond market is the possibility of
hedging, that is in contrast with this assumption.
He et al. (2006) analyse the US government bond market. They use
a sequential trade model to compute the probability of information-based
trading . However, this model does not completely correspond to the market
design of sequential trade models, since they refer to a decentralized market
where each participant can post his own quotes and observe only a fraction
of the buys and sells.
Finally, Arciero (2006) uses a sequential trade model to analyse an elec-
tronic centralized market where only market makers can post bid-ask quotes
and can see the entire sequences of buys and sells. However, he analyses only
10
the inter-dealer segment of the bond market.
3 Institutional environment
For this research we take into consideration two electronic secondary bond
market platforms. One is MTS, acronym of Mercato Telematico dei Titoli di
Stato, that is a wholesale screen-based inter-dealer market for government
securities. As an inter-dealer platform, individual customers are not admit-
ted, instead only dealers are allowed to participate (i.e. banks and financial
institutions and other professional intermediaries who buy and sell securities
for their own account and on behalf of their customers).
The other one is BondVision, part of the MTS Group, it is a wholesale
screen-based multi-dealer-to-customer electronic market for fixed income se-
curities2. On BondVision, primary dealers trade directly with institutional
investors (insurance and asset management companies) by means of a mul-
tiple price auction system.
3.1 MTS
The original MTS market was first introduced in Italy in 1988, it was the
first electronic market created in order to enhance trading in the secondary
market of Italian government bonds. MTS has been the object of many
changes during the past years, starting with the diversification of securities
traded that now include, apart from the government bonds, also other fixed
income securities, that already had a market, also with considerable pro-
portions, but as an over-the-counter one. During the last two decades, the
MTS platform has been typified by many changes, the most important in
chronological orders were: the reform in 1994, the privatization into MTS
2According to the Bank of Italy classification. www.bancaditalia.it/sispaga/sms/mmf/mtsbond.
11
S.p.A. which took place in 1997 and the full anonymity of traders in 2003.
Table 2 gives a clearer picture of the changes which have taken place during
the last twenty years.
Table 2:
Changes in the Italian secondary bond market over the last two decades.
Year Changes in market microstructure
1988 Setting up of MTS Italy
Start of regular re-openings of Treasury auctions
Floor to bid prices abolished for T-bills; uniform price
auction introduced for other bonds
1994 Treasury starts publishing timetable of auctions
Electronic bid submission at auctions
Reserved re-openings for “specialists” in government
securities
Continuous trading on the electronic retail market
1997 Monitoring functions to the MTS management board
Introduction of (ex-ante) anonymity of trades in the
continuous trading market
Floor to bid prices abolished fr T-bills; uniform price
auction introduced for other bonds
1998 First ad-hoc re-openings of Treasury auctions
1999 Setting up of EuroMTS
2003 Introduction of full anonymity of trades with the cen-
tral counterpart (CCP) system
Source: Scalia and Vacca (1999) and Girardi and Piga (2007).
According to the MTS website, MTS S.p.A. is a regulated market,it pro-
vides wholesale electronic trading of Italian government bonds and other
types of fixed income securities. It is regulated by the Italian Ministry of
Economy and Finance, Bank of Italy and CONSOB. The majority stake is
held by Borsa Italiana (60.37 per cent), instead the remaining shares are
owned by international financial institutions3.
In 1999, with the introduction of Euro as the single European currency,
3An exhaustive list of these financial institutions is available on the MTS website, under
the heading “shareholders institutions”. www.mtsspa.it/index.php.
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EuroMTS was created. It is a private London-based company that manages
the pan-European electronic trading platform for government and quasi-
government bonds denominated in Euro with at least  5 billion outstanding.
Today EuroMTS is completely owned by MTS S.p.A.
In May 2001 was launched the EuroCredit MTS, a division of EuroMTS,
which operates as an electronic trading platform for high-quality covered
bonds. There are MTS Domestic Markets which list the government bonds
of the respective European country4.
The latest addition to the “MTS world” is the NewEuroMTS which is a
market built for the trading of euro-denominate government securities of the
ten new States entered in the European Union on 1 May 20045.
The Italian MTS is divided into two sections: one for spot trading where
bonds are exchanged for cash (MTS Cash) and the other is a market for
repurchased agreements (MTS Repos), in which who sells or buys commits
himself respectively to buy or sell the same security back at a future date
for a specified price6.
On MTS Cash segment there are two types of market participants. Par-
ticipants are qualified as dealers and primary dealers. Primary dealers act as
market makers, continuously quoting two-way proposals (bid and ask prices)
that are valid for all participants and for the whole day, unless they are not
modified, cancelled, automatically matched or hit by incoming orders. Mar-
ket takers have not any market making obligation, they must simply accept
or not the quotes of market makers. Since primary dealers, unlike dealers,
4MTS has been successfully launched also outside the Euro area, e.g. MTS Japan Ltd.
and MTS Israel in 2006.
5Countries whose bonds are eligible for trading in the NewEuroMTS Market include:
Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. www.mtsspa.it/index.php.
6If we want to take into consideration also the "grey market", where government bonds
not yet issued can be traded, actually the segments are three.
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may also formulate proposals on any other tradable product and issue orders
for proposals made by other market participants, they can act both as price
makers and price takers7.
Within the group of primary dealers, for purposes of public debt man-
agement, the Ministry of the Economy and Finance selects a restricted list
of so-called Specialists who have to satisfy more stringent requirements. A
number of different short-term and long-term government bonds are traded
on the Italian MTS platform: floating rate treasury certificate (CCTs), fixed
rate bonds (BTPs), inflation-linked bonds (BTPis) and zero-coupon securi-
ties (BOTs and CTZs). There are precise rules governing the functioning of
MTS. There are some market making obligations, involving quoting a min-
imum quantity of a certain bond8, within a maximum spread (which varies
according to the maturity of the asset; it is higher for assets with a longer
maturity) for a minimum cumulative amount of time of at least five hours
per day. Finally when they post quotes they must also specify if it is a block
or a drip quantity. The former represents the overall size of the proposal,
the latter the part of the order that is made visible to the market. The MTS
system actually works as a limit order book, any bond is assigned to many
primary dealers. The trading platform provides a lot of real-time screen-
based information to all market participants, who can easily know the state
of the market and observe the order flow.
The “live” market pages are:
1. The quote page which gives the market makers the possibility to insert
offers; posted proposals can be modified, suspended or reactivated.
7While this work is being carried out there are 29 primary dealers and 71 dealers,
operating on the Cash segment.
8Proposals must be formulated for a minimum lot of 2,5 or 5 million of Euro according
to the instrument traded. Participant may trade the minimum quantity or its multiple.
www.mtsspa.it/index.php.
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2. The market depth page allows participants to see the best 5 bid and ask
prices for each security chosen together with its aggregated quantity.
3. The best page shows the best bid-ask spreads together with its aggre-
gate quantity for all products.
4. The super best page shows the best price for bonds listed on both the
domestic MTS and the EuroMTS. Market maker who has access to
both markets can choose parallel quotation, i.e. they can simultane-
ously post proposals on both platforms.
5. The live market page shows for every bond the average weighted price
and the cumulative amount being traded so far.
Other rules concern trading time. The MTS market is divided into four
phases: pre-market time (from 7:30 am to 8:00 am CET), during this stage
only market makers are fully operative, they can issue and change their
proposals, but primary dealers can see only their own proposals.
The preliminary market time (from 8:00 to 8:15 am CET) during which
both primary dealers and dealers are active. However, during this phase, it
is not allowed the automatic matching among proposals. This is a useful
period because market makers have the opportunity to adjust their proposal
on the base of the other’s market makers observed prices.
The open market time (from 8:15 am to 5: 30 pm CET) during which it
is possible to send proposals and trade and also the automatic matching is
made available.
Finally the close market time during which no trading is allowed but
only the settlement of the contracts already concluded.
Anonymity prevents dealers form managing the counterpart risk, further-
more, in order to mitigate this risk, traders can rely on a central counterpart
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service. Since the end of 2002 a central counterpart service has been active
on an optional basis, supplied by Cassa di Compensazione e Garanzia of
Italy and LCH. Clearnet of France. The role of the central counterpart is
to interpose itself between the parties involved in the trades, becoming the
buyer to the seller and the seller to the buyer in order to guarantee the exe-
cution of the trades by relying on the margin that the trades must deposit.
Thus, anonymity is guaranteed at least until the execution of trades, when
the identity of the parties could be revealed unless there is the use of the
central counterpart, in which case, anonymity is guaranteed also after the
execution of trades.
3.2 BondVision
BondVision is a multi-dealer-to-customer electronic bond trading market.
It is another regulated market, supervised by the Italian Ministry of Econ-
omy and Finance for the government bonds and by CONSOB for the non-
government trading section. It was launched in 2001 in response to contin-
uous requests from institutional investors for access to the liquidity of the
MTS markets.
BondVision allows participants, qualified as primary dealers, to trade
directly with clients, qualified as institutional investors, such as investment
managers, hedge funds, private banks (for this reason we classify BondVision
as another wholesale market, according to the definition on the Bank of Italy,
rather than as a retail market, as defined in some papers9.
On MTS, primary dealers insert a proposal on the Best Page and all
the market participants hit the bid or ask price depending on whether they
want to sell or buy. Subsequently the contract is finalised, i.e. the "‘click and
9See Dunne et al. (2007)
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trade" system, and finally settlement instructions are automatically gener-
ated.
On BondVision platform, instead, a contract is generated only as a con-
sequence of a request from a client (end-user). Three phases characterize the
process on BondVision platform: request, proposal and acceptance.
During the request phase, clients can select a product, the direction of
their trade (if they want buy or sell) and the amount of their title and via
the Request for Quote (RFQ) or request for switch quote (RFSWQ) func-
tionalities, simultaneously send an electronic trade request to a maximum
number of dealers, hence starting an auction10.
During the proposal phase, each dealer participating in the auction send
a responding bid or offer allowing the client to execute the trade at the
best price. Dealers are not required to provide quotes when requested and
clients are not obliged to accept any of the quotes they receive. They have
90 seconds to decide. Also on BondVision there is a Best Page, however the
prices are indicative and not executable and it is absolutely not necessary
that the requests are present in a list on the Best Page, so there is not
a proper order book as for MTS. Furthermore, on BondVision, the client
can also ask for a different settlement time. On BondVision there exists a
minimum request obligation, the minimum lot is 100.00011. We have to
point it out that BondVision is not an anonymous environment, since, when
a client send a RFQ, he selects the dealers and the dealers selected, in turn,
know who is the client who sent them the request. Furthermore, when a
10Each client is not allowed to send a RFQ to every dealer, but he can request quotes
only to a certain number of dealers (At the moment five). More precisely, when a new
client joins BondVision, he gives preference to some dealers and each dealer selected, in
turn, agrees to trade with the client and chooses the titles on which is willing to offer
liquidity.
11The Bank of Italy is currently revising the regulation, in order to diminish the mini-
mum tradable quantity to 1.000.
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dealer sends a proposal to answer a request of a client, he knows the prices
that other dealers involved have quoted but he does not know their identities.
During the last phase, the contracts concluded are regulated directly by
the parts. There is any regulation for the settlement. Thus, since there is
any regulation for the settlement procedure, of course there is no possibility
to make use of the central counterpart, so there is not anonymity neither in
this phase.
4 The model
4.1 The information and trading structure
Our model belongs to the class of “sequential trade models” that date back
to the work of Glosten and Milgrom (1985). More precisely it lies in the
category of those works which use a model á la Easley and O’Hara (1992).
These types of models introduce as a difference to the classic sequential trade
model an additional source of uncertainty, that they define event uncertainty
which arises because an information event could have occurred or not.
We modify this reference model with adjustments that partly reflect those
made by other works and partly are changes introduced for our specific duty.
We consider an asset which has been contemporaneously traded on both
an inter-dealer and a dealer-to-customer platform, which are differing in
many respects. The true value of the asset is represented by a random
variable V. On the inter-dealer platform there are many market makers who
act competitively and continuously post bid and ask prices at which a trade
can take place.
Following the hypothesis of Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model, market
makers are assumed to be rational, risk-neutral and acting competitively. In
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their model there is the presence of a single market maker (in our case there
are many market makers, but since they are assumed to act competitively,
the hypothesis can be considered still valid).
The rationality hypothesis implies that the market maker knows that the
order flow (i.e. the sequence of buys and sells occurred throughout the day)
is correlated with the true value of the asset, so he uses the indirect evidence
from the order flow to infer what this underlying value could be. The market
maker can learn from the order flow. Each time that he observes a buy, he can
infer that this trade comes either from an informed trader, who has positive
private information concerning the traded asset, or from an uninformed one.
On the contrary, if he observes a sell he can assume that the order comes
from an informed trader who knows bad news, or from an uninformed one.
The key to extract information from the order flow is a Bayesian learn-
ing process, throughout which the market maker reviews his beliefs about
the bid-ask quotes observing the sequences of buys and sells. Competition
dictates that any rent earned on trades would be put away by a competing
specialist. The market maker sets the bid-ask spread in order to have zero
expected profit and avoid entries. Competition drives profit to zero.
The risk neutrality assumption avoids that inventory matters, as it would
instead be the case with risk aversion or if the order flow were not observable
to all market makers. In this case, the market maker’s prices might reflect
information known only to himself, but with risk-neutrality such inventory-
based pricing effects will not arise.
The dealer-to-customer platform, is instead a quote-driven market where
clients send requests for quotes to dealers who are mainly those who act
as market makers on the inter-dealer platform. Thus, it is clear that the
two platforms differ widely for many aspects, but the difference that is more
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concerned with our purpose is the dissimilar degree of transparency which
characterizes them, given that we are interested in investigating the presence
of asymmetric information in the treasury bond markets and empirically in-
specting if informed traders prefer the less transparent one. The trading
period is a trading day, trading days are indexed by i ∈ [1, I]. Each trad-
ing day is divided into trading intervals of a given length, time within the
trading day is discrete and it is indexed by t ∈ [0, T ] and at each interval
a trader is selected. The length of the trading interval is chosen to make
possible at least one trade in each interval. The choice of a trading day
as trading period is certainly arbitrary and not so respondent to reality, be-
cause prices could adjust to new information in minutes and new information
events could happen more frequently than once per day. However, since the
trading period is defined as the average time it takes to incorporate private
information into prices, the choice of the trading day as trading period seems
plausible. Moreover, Easley and O’Hara (1992) uphold the choice of a trad-
ing day as trading period because, using their words,“[. . . ]what matters for
our analysis is the learning confronting market participants. This is most
easily characterised by adopting the fiction of a trading day and assuming
that information events occur only between trading days”12.
Each trading day, before trading begins, nature selects whether or not
an information event will occur. Information events are assumed to be inde-
pendently distributed 13.
If an information event has occurred, this means that there has been the
delivery of a signal (Ψ) about the true value (V ) of the asset; this happens
with probability α. When an information event has occurred, the type of
12Easley and O’Hara (1992), p. 580.
13Arciero (2006) does not find a univocal solution to the rejection or not of this assump-
tion, since the result of the specification test is not clear.
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signal can be a high signal (H) in case of good news (g), with probability δ,
or a low signal (L) in case of bad news (b), with probability (1− δ).
On the contrary, when no private information is disclosed, we will have
a no-event day, in which case the signal is Ψ = 0, with probability (1− α).
If there is no event, the probability of a trade is given respectively by Q and
O for the quote-driven and the order-driven platforms and, similarly, that
of a no trade by (1− Q) and (1− O) always for the two platforms.
Let (Vi)Ii=1 be the random variable giving the value of the asset at the
end of each trading day. During day i, if an information event occurs, the
value of the asset conditional on good news is V i = E[V |Ψ = H], on bad
news is V i = E [V |Ψ = L].
The value of the asset if no news occurs is V ∗i = δV i+(1− δ)Vi, (assuming,
of course, V i < V ∗i < V i).
What we have been describing so far represents what Easley et al. (1997a,b)
called the information process which describes the information state that is
reached only at the beginning of each trading day. Here after, there is the
beginning of what could be defined as the choosing process, which illustrates
the choice of the platform from the market maker, which is not necessar-
ily a mutually exclusive choice, since the market maker can take a different
position contemporaneously on both platforms.
In our model market makers decide on which platform to trade, they
choose to trade on the inter-dealer quote-driven platform with probability β
and on the dealer-to-customer order-driven platform with probability (1−β).
The last stage is, using again the words of Easley et al. (1997a,b), the
trading process which describes the traders’ choices and their behaviour dur-
ing each information state. For the trade in the next trading interval, only
the last two processes are repeated and this continues through the trading
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day.
At each trading interval a trader is selected. If an information event has
occurred, an informed trader is selected with probability µQ on the quote-
driven platform and µO on the order-driven platform and then he can choose
whether to buy or sell with respective probabilities.
Informed traders know, before the trading day begins, whether the true
value of the asset will take a high or low value.
At each trading interval an informed trader will buy the asset if nature
has delivered good news, with probability one, and he will sell it, with prob-
ability one, if the nature has delivered bad news.
Similarly, an uninformed trader is selected with probability (1 − µQ)
(quote-driven platform) and (1 − µO)(order-driven platform), and again he
decides to buy, sell or not to trade with the respective probabilities.
If no information event has occurred, all traders are uninformed and the
trader selected may choose again to sell, buy or not to trade. Thus, an
informed trader will always trade provided that the ask price is below the
value of the asset in case of a high signal or the bid price is above the value
of the asset in case of a low signal.
An uninformed trader, instead, will trade only on the base of his portfolio
purposes.
The market maker knows that there are informed and uninformed traders
in the market, but he does not know with which type of trader is actually
trading. Furthermore, we assume that the arrival rates of uninformed and
informed traders in both markets is given, however, there is no reason to
think that these arrival rates must be equal between the two markets.
The addition to the market structure of the event uncertainty at the
beginning of each trading day, with respect to the Glosten and Milgrom
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(1985) model, implies that in some time intervals there could be no trade.
In this perspective, market makers learn not only from trades but also from
the lack of trades because each event provides an information.
Since informed traders are assumed always to trade if selected, all the no
trading intervals happen because an uninformed trader was selected and he
has decided not to trade.
Given these assumptions, we might expect that the probability of a no
trading interval occurring is negatively correlated with the probability of
a newsworthy event, Brown et al. (1999) reach the same conclusions, using
only order data, so they consider, instead of no trading intervals the no order
intervals.
However, we have to bear in mind that a no-trade observation is not a
sufficient component by itself to infer whether there has been an information
event. In fact, this can occur both when there has not been any information
event and when a trader decides not to trade for portfolio reasons. At the
same time, we have to notice that a no-trade outcome is more likely to
occur when there is no new information; this statement can be confirmed
simply looking at the probabilities. Consider, as an example, only the quote-
driven market. If there is no new information event, the probability of no
trade is given by (1 − Q), instead if an information event has occurred
and the uninformed trader has decided to not trade, this probability falls
to (1 − µQ)(1 − Q), because now there are both informed and uninformed
traders in the market.
For our model, we are considering the parallel trading of a same asset
on two trading platforms of the secondary government bond market. In
constructing our model we extend the model of Easley and O’Hara (1992)
and we follow also the work of Grammig et al. (2001) who analyse the parallel
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trading in the German stock market, where an anonymous electronic market
and a non-anonymous trading system coexist.
In the afore mentioned work, the authors wonder about the coexistence
of markets with differing degrees of anonymity and wondered which traders
prefer which market. They test empirically the hypothesis that informed
traders prefer the anonymous market.
In our specif case, we want to investigate the presence of informed and
uninformed traders on both platforms and we want to verify the assumption
that the presence of informed traders is grater on the market characterised
by a higher degree of transparency. On both markets there is the presence of
informed and uninformed traders. Informed traders buy on the two platforms
with probability one if they know good knows and zero if they know bad
news; uninformed traders instead, after having decided to trade, can choose
if buy with a probability η or sell with probability (1 − η). The overall
decisional process is shown in the tree diagram in Figure 1.
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Figure 1: Tree diagram of the trading process
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The evolution of prices through the day follows a Bayesian learning pro-
cess14. The market maker does not know neither if an information event has
occurred nor if it is a good or a bad event. However, the market maker can
observe all trading activity, this allows him to capture information and to
revise his beliefs. This revision, in turn, causes quotes and prices to adjust.
Consider the market maker acting on the inter-dealers quote-driven plat-
form15. At the beginning, when market opens, the market maker beliefs
about the unconditional probabilities for no news (n), good news (g) and
bad news (b) are given by: PQ(0) = (1 − α, αδ, α (1− δ). After each trade
interval, these probabilities are updated, using Bayes’ rule.
PQ(t) = (PQ,n(t), PQ,g(t), PQ,b(t)) is the vector of the subjective probabili-
ties conditional on the trade history in the market prior to time t.
The expected asset value, conditional of the trade history is:
EQ(Vi|t) = PQ,n(t) · V ∗i + PQ,g(t) · V i + PQ,b(t) · V i (1)
The trade outcome at time t is given by:
θt ∈ {NT, SQ, SO, BQ, BO}
where NT denotes no-trade, SQ and SO denote a sell respectively on the
quote-driven and on the order-driven platforms, finally BQ and BO the same
for a buy.
The first bid and ask quotes, given respectively by bQ,1 and aQ,1, conditional
of observing a buy BQ,1 or a sellSQ,1 are given by:
14The Bayesian approach provides a mathematical rule explaining how the existing
beliefs about something can be changed in the light of new evidence. Bayes rule allows to
infer on the occurrence of a probabilistic event, given the observation of some data and a
prior belief about the event. The generic Bayes rule can be stated as following:
p(event|data) = (p(event)·(data|event))
p(data)
= (p(event)·(data|event))
(p(data|event)·(event)+p(data|notevent)·(notevent))
For a more detailed explanation seeO’Hara (1997), pp. 78-82.
15The derivation for the dealer-to customer order-driven platform is identical.
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aQ,1 = E[V |BQ,1] = V ·P {Ψ = L|BQ,1}+V ·P {Ψ = H|BQ,1}+V ∗ ·P {Ψ = 0|BQ,1}
(2)
bQ,1 = E[V |SQ,1] = V ·P {Ψ = L|SQ,1}+V ·P {Ψ = H|SQ,1}+V ∗ ·P {Ψ = 0|SQ,1}
(3)
The spread is just the difference between the ask and the bid prices. In
order to derive the spread, the market maker must compute the posterior
probabilities applying the Bayes rule. Market makers know the structure of
the market but they do not know neither if an information event is occurred
and whether it is good or bad signal since it has happened, nor whether
any particular trader is informed. However, market makers can watch the
market and adjust their beliefs on the base of the trading activity results.This
revision process causes quotes and thus prices to change. This process, for
the first trade of the day, requires that the market maker calculates the
expected value of the asset conditioned on any possible type of trade that
can occur.
Thus, in order to determine the conditional probability of the high value
(V ), if there was not a signal, this probability remains unchanged at δ; if,
instead, an information event has occurred, P
{
V = V
}
becomes one if the
signal is high and zero if the signal is low. Consequently, the market maker’s
updating formula is:
P
{
V = V |θ} = 0 · P {Ψ = L|θ}+ 1 · P {Ψ = H|θ}+ δ · P {Ψ = 0|θ} (4)
Since the market maker use Bayesian learning to update his beliefs, the pos-
terior probabilities can be derived applying the following generic Bayes rule:
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P {Ψ = X|θ} =
P {Ψ = X} · P {θ|Ψ = X}
P {Ψ = L} · P {θ|Ψ = L}+ P {Ψ = H} · P {θ|Ψ = H}+ P {Ψ = 0} · P {θ|Ψ = 0} (5)
The explicit probabilities can be derived from the tree diagram in Figure 1.
To give an example, the market maker’s updating formula in case that a
high signal has occurred, given a sale on the quote-driven platform is:
P
{
V = V |SQ,1
}
= 1 · P {Ψ = L|SQ,1}+ 0 · P {Ψ = H|SQ,1}+ δ · P {Ψ = 0|SQ,1} (6)
The posterior probabilities, on the RHS of the (5)expression, can be com-
puted by applying the Bayes rule and using the event tree diagram. The
posterior probability P {Ψ = H|SQ,1} is given by the following expression:
P
{
Ψ = H|SQ,1
}
=
P {Ψ = H} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = H}
P {Ψ = H} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = H}+ P {Ψ = L} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = L}+ P {Ψ = 0} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = 0}
αδβ(1− µQ)Q(1− η)
αδβ(1− µQ)Q(1− η) + α(1− δ)[βµQ + β(1− µQ)Q(1− η] + (1− α)βQ(1− η)
(7)
It is possible to derive, in the same manner, the other posterior probabilities
in order to obtain the initial bid and ask quotes set by the market maker.
P
{
Ψ = L|SQ,1
}
=
P {Ψ = L} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = L}
P {Ψ = H} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = H}+ P {Ψ = L} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = L}+ P {Ψ = 0} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = 0}
=
α(1− δ) [βµQ + β(1− µQ)Q(1− η)]
αδβ(1− µQ)Q(1− η) + α(1− δ)[βµQ + β(1− µQ)Q(1− η)] + (1− α)βQ(1− η)
(8)
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P
{
Ψ = L|SQ,1
}
=
P {Ψ = 0} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = 0}
P {Ψ = H} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = H}+ P {Ψ = L} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = L}+ P {Ψ = 0} · P {SQ,1|Ψ = 0}
=
(1− α)βQ (1− η)
αδβ(1− µQ)Q(1− η) + α(1− δ)[βµQ + β(1− µQ)Q(1− η)] + (1− α)βQ(1− η)
(9)
Reiterating the same process, it is possible to recover all the probabili-
ties(included in the previous three expressions)and compute the first bid
and ask quotes. After the first round, the market maker computes the fol-
lowing bid and ask quotes, now conditioned on the past history, i.e. given
that the market maker has observed a buy or a sell during the first trade,
and the type of trade which can take place on the second round; and so on
for the subsequent trading rounds.
Assuming that a buy has occurred, on the quote-driven platform, during
the first round, the prices set by the market maker will be:
aQ,2 = E [V |BQ,2, BQ,1] =
V · P {Ψ = L|BQ,2, BQ,1}
+ V · P {Ψ = H|BQ,2, BQ,1}
+ V ∗ · P {Ψ = 0|BQ,2, BQ,1} (10)
bQ,2 = E[V |SQ,2, BQ,1] =
V · P {Ψ = L|SQ,2, BQ,1}
+ V · P {Ψ = H|SQ,2, BQ,1}
+ V ∗ · P {Ψ = 0|SQ, 2, BQ,1} (11)
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The bid and ask prices of the second round differ from the bid ans ask prices
of the first round aQ,1 and bQ,1 for the posterior probabilities that, for the
second round, are conditioned both on the past history and on the type of
trade which can occur at the current round.
P
{
Ψ = H|SQ,1,SQ,2
}
=
P
{
Ψ = H|SQ,1
} · P {SQ,2|Ψ = H}
P
{
Ψ = L|SQ,1
} · P {SQ,2|Ψ = L} + P {Ψ = H|SQ,1} · P {SQ,2|Ψ = H} + P {Ψ = 0|SQ,1} · P {SQ,2|Ψ = 0}
(12)
Where P {Ψ = H|SQ,1}, P {Ψ = L|SQ,1} and P {Ψ = H|SQ,1} are the pos-
terior probabilities derived during the first round.
Furthermore, P {SQ,2|Ψ = H} = P {SQ,1|Ψ = H},
P {SQ,2|Ψ = L} = P {SQ,1|Ψ = L} and P {SQ,2|Ψ = 0} = P {SQ,1|Ψ = 0},
because the traders are assumed independently drawn from the same distri-
bution.
This process is reiterated many times to derive the bid and ask quotes set
by the market maker at each round. The bid and ask quotes at time t will
be given by the expected value of the asset conditional on the past history
(the number of buys,sells and no trades reported between the first and the
tth interval) and the type of trade which may take place at time t-1. For a
full derivation see Appendix B.
4.2 The trading process
The empirical application of sequential trade models raises some problems
due to the fact that neither the occurrence of information events nor the
associated arrival of informed and uniformed traders is directly observable.
What instead it is usually directly observable, is the sequence of trading
events, i.e. the incoming buy and sell orders.
With a data set which contains daily records of the number of sells and
buys for a total number of trading days we can estimate the nine parameters
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of the trade process and inference of the relevance of informed trading can
be drawn employing standard maximum likelihood techniques.
The parameter vector is: Ω = [α, δ, β, µO, µQ, O, Q, η]
′ . Assuming that
arrival rates depend on the type of trading day, it is possible to infer infor-
mation, concerning the event type and the associated arrival rates, observing
the number of buys, sells and no trades on different days in the sample.
To estimate the nine parameters we write a likelihood function to describe
the model and then fit this function to the trading data, using a maximum
likelihood technique. Writing the likelihood function entails some steps.
First we have to estimate the joint likelihood of observing a given trade
history on both markets. The probability of observing the five different
events: BO buys on the order-driven platform, BQ buys on the quote-driven
platform, SO sells on the order-driven platform, SQ sells on the quote-driven
platform and NT no-trade events occurred in a day, conditional of the choice
made by the nature (good news, bad news, no news).
Reminding that during a day, trading outcomes are independently drawn
by the same distribution. Hence, the probability of observing the five differ-
ent events on a good news day i is given by:
Pg (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT ||good news; Ω) =
[(βµQ) + (β (1− µQ) Qη)]BQ · [(1− β)µO + (1− β) (1− µO) Oη]BO
· [β(1− µQ)Q(1− η)]SQ · [(1− β)(1− µO)O(1− η)]SO (13)
· [β(1− µQ)(1− Q) + (1− β)(1− µO)(1− O)]NT
On a bad news day the corresponding probability is given by:
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Pb (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT ||bad news; Ω) =
[β (1− µQ) Qη]BQ · [(1− β) (1− µO) Oη]BO
· [βµQ + β (1− µQ) Q (1− η)]SQ
· [(1− β)µO + (1− β) (1− µO) O (1− η)]SO (14)
· [β (1− µQ) (1− Q) + (1− β) (1− µO) (1− O)]NT
And finally on a no news day, the corresponding probability is the following:
Pn (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT ||no news; Ω) =
[βQη]
BQ · [(1− β) Oη]BO
· [βQ(1− η)]SQ · [(1− β)O(1− η)]SO (15)
· [β (1− Q) + (1− β) (1− O)]NT
Each of the three types of event has five different equations, for a total of
fifteen. It is possible to recover the unconditional likelihood for a generic
trading day, is a mixture of the three conditional probabilities (13),(14) and
(15), weighted by the probabilities of observing the information regimes: αδ
for good event days, α(1 − δ) if bad event days take place and (1 − α) for
non event days.
Following the unconditional likelihood for a single day:
32
Pi (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT ; Ω) =
αδ · Pg (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |good news; Ω)+
α (1− δ) · Pb (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |bad news; Ω)+
(1− α) · Pn (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |no news; Ω) (16)
The log-likelihood for I trading days is obtained by summing the loga-
rithms of daily likelihood contributions over the whole sample period:
L (α, δ, β, µO, µQ, O, Q, η|BOt, BQt, SOt, SQt, NTt) =
=
I∑
t=i

αδ · Pg (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |good news; Ω)+
α (1− δ) · Pb (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |bad news; Ω)+
(1− α) · Pn (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |no news; Ω)
(17)
5 Data
Our database is composed of two datasets of fixed rate bonds (BTP - Buoni
Pluriennali del Tesoro) with an original ten-year maturity,which have been
on-the-run and off-the-run during the period taken into consideration.
One dataset contains records of traders and proposals of BTPs traded
on MTS platform from January 2004 to November 2006. For our purpose
we will focus only on the MTS Cash segment, characterized by institutional
features which are closer to those typified in the theoretical model.
The other dataset contains records of traders and requests for quotes of
BTPs traded on BondVision platform form January 2004 to February 2007.
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We treat our database as a time series, considering only the number of
contracts on both platforms16.
The long term fixed coupon bonds accounted for 57.59 per cent of out-
standing securities for government debt on 30 June 2008 and, for the time
of our sample, for 59.93 per cent17.
One of the principal advantage of our database is that it records the
trade direction, i.e. whether a trade was a buyer or a seller initiated, which
is an important piece of information to conduct empirical studies. The prob-
lem is that high-frequency data sets rarely include information concerning
the counterparts, so empirical works had to use ad hoc algorithms to infer
from the data the initiator of each trade. This represents a great improve-
ment with respect to past empirical works because these techniques were
not exempt from mistakes, leaving miss-classified traders that, in turn, can
significantly bias the results18.
Before proceeding with the analysis, we adopt a procedure to filter our
database in order to drop biased data and errors. First of all we drop all the
observations without quantities and prices.
Second, we drop all snapshots with a negative best spread, on the top of
the book. 19.
Third, we eliminate all observations for the 1st, 2nd and 3rd August
200420.
16The bonds in our database are: IT0003472336, IT0003618383, IT0003719918,
IT0003844534 and IT0004019581
17Treasury website. www.dt.tesoro.it/en
18For further information see for example Ellis et al. (2000) and Kokot (2004)
19Best spread = best ask price - best bid price (i.e the difference between the lowest ask
and the highest bid)
20The Financial Services Authority (FSA) found that City Group Global Markets Lim-
ited (CGML) executed a trading strategy on the European government bond markets on
2 August 2004 which involved the firm building up and then rapidly exiting from very
substantial long positions in European government bonds over a period of an hour. The
trade caused a temporary disruption to the volumes of bonds quoted and traded on the
MTS platform, a sharp drop in bond prices and a temporary withdrawal by some par-
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For the BondVision platform, we drop all contracts for which there are no
corresponding proposals or for which the time elapsed between trading and
proposals is greater than 90 seconds. Since we are considering parallel trading
on both platforms, we construct our investigation sample taking data form
February 2004 to November 2006, for a total of 77172 observations over 708
days. The snapshots in the datasets run from 8:30am to 5:30pm21. Following
tables show descriptive statistics of our data, for data at 5-minute intervals
and for aggregate data on daily base.
ticipants from quoting on that platform. The FSA fined CGML on 28 June 2005, £13.9
million (20.9mn) for Eurobond trades. Source: www.fsa.gov.uk
21There are also some snapshots before 8:30am, but they are so few to be negligible.
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics (5-min intervals)
Statistics BO BQ SO SQ NT
N 77172 77172 77172 77172 77172
Mean 1.265916 .4688618 1.251899 .4427253 .5758436
Variance 1.166079 2.168952 1.48462 2.157726 .2442509
Skeweness 10.63568 10.44705 11.48178 10.63646 -.3069259
Kurtosis 157.125 206.8866 164.7231 209.6262 1.094203
Minimum 1 0 1 0 0
Median 1 0 1 0 1
Maximum 21 54 24 54 1
Mode 1 0 1 0 1
BO = Number of buys on the order-driven platform, SO = Number of sells on the
order-driven platform, BQ = Number of buys on the quote-driven platform, SQ =
Number of sells on the quote driven platform, NT = Number of no trade intervals.
Table 4: Descriptive statistics (trading days)
Statistics BO BQ SO SQ NT
N 708 708 708 708 708
Mean 9.689266 51.10593 7.44774 48.25706 62.76695
Variance 55.71377 965.0849 39.06233 950.8447 155.0984
Skeweness 1.295985 1.647741 1.446309 1.4769 .2381942
Kurtosis 4.998458 7.074138 6.161667 6.091669 3.868375
Minimum 0 0 0 0 19
Median 8 44 6 41 63
Maximum 42 216 41 212 109
Mode 2 37 2 0 34
BO = Number of buys on the order-driven platform, SO = Number of sells on the
order-driven platform, BQ = Number of buys on the quote-driven platform, SQ =
Number of sells on the quote driven platform, NT = Number of no trade intervals.
6 Empirical analysis
We will perform a maximum likelihood estimation of our data, on the base
of the log-likelihood specified in equation (17):
L (α, δ, β, µO, µQ, O, Q, η|BOt, BQt, SOt, SQt, NTt) =
=
708∑
t=1

αδ · Pg (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |good news; Ω)+
α (1− δ) · Pb (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |bad news; Ω)+
(1− α) · Pn (BO ∩BQ ∩ SO ∩ SQ ∩NT |no news; Ω)
(18)
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First of all we have to compute the number of no trade intervals taking place
between two trades. For this purpose, we construct a dummy variable (NT)
for no-trading time intervals, which takes value 1 if there is not a trade and
0 otherwise.
However, the number of no trade intervals is sensitive to the length of
the trading intervals, so the choice of it may have consequences. Easley and
O’Hara (1992) choose 5-minute as benchmark interval because this length
makes feasible at least one trade in each interval. Furthermore, we replicate
our estimates using intervals of different length, to be sure that the choice of
the length does not influence our results. For our study the range of possible
interval lengths goes from 1 to 10 minutes, however, given the high number
of observations that we already have choosing a 5-minute length interval, we
replicate our analysis only for intervals longer than 5-minute.
The results of the maximum likelihood estimation (18) give the following
results for the platforms:
Table 5: Parameters estimation (MTS platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3804801 .0197189 19.30 0.000 .3418317 .4191285
δ .5523178 .0318068 17.36 0.000 .4899777 .6146579
µ .2438671 .0035026 69.62 0.000 .2370021 .2507321
 .562448 .0017519 321.06 0.000 .5590144 .5658816
Log-likelihood = -122813.62
Table 6: Parameters estimation (BondVision platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3942688 0224058 17.60 0.000 .3503543 .4381833
δ .6823738 .0314929 21.67 0.000 .6206489 .7440988
µ .1551226 .0037176 41.73 0.000 .1478362 .162409
 .1607788 .0020581 78.12 0.000 .156745 .1648126
Log-likelihood = -36641.072
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According to these results, during the sample period, market makers ex-
pect that the event days (the value of the parameter α) occur with probability
0.38 on the MTS platform and 0.39 on the BondVision platform.
Good event days (the value of the parameter δ) are slightly more likely
than bad event days on MTS platform and considerably more likely on Bond-
Vision.
Market makers assign a value 0.56 to the probability that an uninformed
trader execute a trade ( the value of the parameter ) on MTS and a value
of 0.16 on BondVision.
The fraction of trades due to informed traders (the value of the parameter
µ) is 0.24 on MTS and 0.16 on Bond Vision.
The estimates of all parameters are accurate, as we can infer from the
confidence intervals and from the values of the standard errors. The standard
errors emphasize that the accuracy of the estimates is greater for µ and
 than for α and δ. On the whole, the empirical evidence suggests that
the maximum likelihood estimation has been successful in identifying the
parameters underlying our theoretical model.
Furthermore, we derive the probability of informed trading on the two
platforms assuming that the probability to encounter an informed trader on
the less transparent market is higher than the corresponding probability on
the more transparent one.
The probability of informed trading on the two platform is given by:
PIT =
αµ
αµ+ (1− µ)  (19)
giving a result of 18 per cent on MTS and of 31 per cent on BondVision.
These results confirm our assumption that the probability to encounter an
informed trader is higher on the less transparent platform.
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We have to point out that our theoretical model is constructed for both
platforms, but convergence problems have not allowed to estimate the pa-
rameters for the whole model. However, the value of the estimates that we
obtain from the two separate markets are still informative.
6.1 Robustness tests
As a first test, the length of the trade intervals is varied to verify the stability
of the estimates. We replicate the maximum log-likelihood for two alternative
datasets, one which contains trade intervals for 8-minute length and another
for 10-minute length. Arciero (2006) considers interval lengths of 1, 2, 8 and
10 minutes. He finds that the estimates of the parameter µ and  exhibit
an increasing path for intervals of increasing length. For our database, we
do not register any difference in the estimates. A summary of the results is
reported in Appendix A.
To asses the validity of the independence of information events from
day to day we follow Easley and O’Hara (1992). As a first step, we need
to divide the days in event and no event days. We classify event days on
the base of parameter α, because event days are characterized by a higher
trading volume. Our results show for a value of α = 0.38 on MTS platform,
269 trading days and 439 no trading days. On BondVision platform, with
α = 0.39, 481 trading days and 227 no trading days are obtained.
After having divided the days in two sample we perform a run test. A run
test is a non-parametric test that we use to investigate whether the sequences
of event and no vent days are independent. For MTS data we obtain 277
runs of event and non event days, for BondVision we get 187 runs of event
and no event days. With value of the statistic Z equal respectively to -4.6
and -10.7 we reject the null hypothesis of independence of days.
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The same test is replicated for the sub-sample of event and no event
days, to verify whether the arrivals of good and bad news are independently
distributed. In this case we find 108 runs for MTS platform and 89 runs
for BondVision. Once again we reject the null hypothesis of independence
between good and bad event days.
Although this specification test reject one of the assumptions of the
model, i.e. the independence of information events across the sample days,
this does not mean that the theoretical model is not correct. It suggests that
is necessary a further analysis, relaxing the assumption of independence and
allowing the parameters of the model to be either auto-correlated or cross-
correlated.
Finally, autocorrelation and partial autocorrelation of the random vari-
ables number of daily buys on MTS (BQ), number of daily buys on BondVi-
sion (BO), number of daily sells on MTS (SQ), number of daily sells (SO) on
BondVision and number of no trade days (NT), show that there is persistence
in the data. However, Easley and O’Hara (1992) argue that dependence does
not affect the estimates of µ and , because they are determined by the num-
ber of trades and no trades occurred within a trading day. Nonetheless, the
estimates of α and δ may be affected since they are derived from the distri-
bution of trades and no trades between days. Details of the autocorrelations
and partial autocorrelations for six lags are reported in Appendix C.
7 Conclusions
In this paper we investigate the presence of asymmetric information in the
two secondary government bond market. We analyse the parallel trading of
fixed rate bond (BTP) with a ten-year maturity on two secondary electronic
platforms: the inter-dealer MTS and the dealer-to-customer BondVision.
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Our model allows to explain the stochastic process governing the asset
prices on the base of the number of buys, sells and no trade intervals occurred
over a sample of 708 days.
Asymmetric information arises since each day nature deliver a signal to
the market about the true value of the asset. This signal could be good or
bad and it is delivered only to a fraction of traders (informed traders).
The dataset allows us to know exactly the type of trades occurred, i.e. if
it is a buy or a sell. This is a remarkable advantage compared to works that
use an ad-hoc algorithm to infer this piece of information, introducing noise
in the results.
The two platforms under analysis differ for the degree of transparency
that typifies them. We assume that the probability to encounter an informed
trader on the less transparent market is higher than the corresponding prob-
ability on the more transparent one. Our results confirm this assumption,
since informed traders on MTS are 18 per cent, whereas on BondVision, the
less transparent platform, they are 31 per cent. Although our theoretical
model is constructed to include both platforms, the value of the estimates
that we obtain from the two separate markets are still informative.
Furthermore, we perform a series of robustness tests.
First we check for the robustness of our estimates to different lengths of
the trade intervals. We estimate the maximum log-likelihood also for time
intervals of 8 and 10 minutes, and we do not find any significant difference.
Second we perform a non-parametric run test to asses the independence
of information events form day to day. This test rejects the null hypothesis
of independence. However this finding does not controvert the hypothesis of
our model, but calls for further analysis, in order to relax the assumption
of independence and allow the parameters of the model to be either auto-
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correlated or cross-correlated.
Finally, we investigate the presence of autocorrelation and partial auto-
correlation in the random variables of our model. Also in this case the results
are not respondent to the hypothesis of no dependence, calling for further
investigation.
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Appendix A
Table 7: 8-min intervals (MTS platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3804801 .0024091 157.94 0.000 .3757584 .3852017
δ .5523178 .0038858 142.14 0.000 .5447017 .5599338
µ .2438671 .0004279 569.90 0.000 .2430284 .2447058
 .562448 .000214 2627.98 0.000 .5620285 .5628675
Log-likelihood = -8228512.2
Table 8: 8-min intervals (BondVision platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3942688 0027373 144.04 0.000 .3889038 .3996338
δ .6823738 .0038475 177.36 0.000 .6748329 .6899147
µ .1551226 .0004542 341.55 0.000 .1542325 .1560128
 .1607788 .0002514 639.44 0.000 .160286 .1612716
Log-likelihood = -2454951.8
Table 9: 10-min intervals (MTS platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3804801 .0026589 143.10 0.000 .3752687 .3856914
δ .5523178 .0042888 128.78 0.000 .5439118 .5607237
µ .2438671 .0004723 516.25 0.000 .2429414 .2447928
 .562448 .0002362 2381.04 0.000 .561985 .562911
Log-likelihood = -6754748.9
Table 10: 10-min intervals (BondVision platform)
Parameter Coef. Std. Err. Z P > |Z| 95% Conf. Interval
α .3942688 .0030212 130.50 0.000 .3883474 .4001902
δ .6823738 .0042465 160.69 0.000 .6740508 .6906968
µ .1551226 .0005013 309.45 0.000 .1541401 .1561051
 .1607788 .0002775 579.35 0.000 .1602349 .1613227
Log-likelihood = -2015259
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Appendix B
For a trade at time t we have:
P {Ψ = H|θ1, . . . θt−1, SQ,t} =
P {Ψ = H|θ1, . . . θt−1} · P {SQ,t|θ1, . . . θt−1,Ψ = H}
P {SQ,t|θ1, . . . θt−1}
where the probability of a sale on the quote-driven platform, given (θ1, . . . θt−1)
is:
P {SQ,t|θ1, . . . θt−1} =
P {Ψ = H|θ1, . . . θt−1} · β (1− µQ) Q (1− η)
+ P {Ψ = L|θ1, . . . θt−1} · βµQ + β (1− µQ) Q (1− η)
+ P {Ψ = 0|θ1, . . . θt−1} · βQ (1− η)
The market maker’s ask and bid in period t are given by expected value of
the asset conditional on the history and, a buy or a sell respectively.
aQ,t = E [V |BQ,t] =
V · P {Ψ = L|θ1, . . . θt−1, BQ,t}
+ V · P {Ψ = H|θ1, . . . θt−1BQ,t}
+ V ∗ · P {Ψ = 0|BQ,t}
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bQ,t = E [V |SQ,t] =
V · P {Ψ = L|θ1, . . . θt−1, SQ,t}
+ V · P {Ψ = H|θ1, . . . θt−1SQ,t}
+ V ∗ · P {Ψ = 0|sQ,t}
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Appendix C
Figure 2: Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of daily buys
 
 
 
46
Figure 3: Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of daily sells
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Figure 4: Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of daily no-trade
intervals
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Fig. 1e:  Autocorrelations and partial autocorrelations of daily no-trade intervals
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